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 (i) 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) permits 
a party moving for a new trial based on juror dishones-
ty during voir dire to introduce juror testimony about 
statements made during deliberations that tend to 
show the alleged dishonesty. 
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GREGORY P. WARGER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
RANDY D. SHAUERS, 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
 
BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE PROFESSORS OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici are professors of law who have written ex-
tensively on the history of the jury, the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, and the right to an impartial jury.  Amici 
accordingly have a scholarly interest in the historical 
background and proper resolution of the question pre-
sented here.1 
                                                 
1 Letters consenting to the filing of this amicus brief have 
been filed with the Clerk of the Court.  No counsel for a party au-
thored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than ami-
ci or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the prepara-
tion or submission of this brief. 
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Amici are: 
• Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson II Professor 
of Law, Duke Law School 
• Lisa Kern Griffin, Professor of Law, Duke Law 
School 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case requires the Court to consider the inter-
section of two distinct practices:  (1) the American tra-
dition of allowing litigants to inquire into the biases of 
potential jurors through voir dire and giving litigants 
the right to seek relief when a juror fails to disclose a 
bias and is wrongly empaneled, and (2) the historical 
rule barring jurors from disclosing the contents of their 
deliberations in order to impeach their verdicts, which 
is now codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), but 
which at common law was known as the Mansfield Rule.  
A review of the history and purposes of these two prac-
tices reveals that the latter was never intended to 
trump or undermine the former. 
Voir dire in its present American form was essen-
tially unknown in England.  While jurors in England 
could be challenged for cause, litigants were allowed to 
examine jurors about their biases only in limited circum-
stances.  By contrast, America has developed a robust 
commitment to voir dire, which has proven to be essen-
tial to the American jury selection process.  In at least 
some cases, it has been recognized as a constitutionally 
required element of the right to an impartial jury. 
The Mansfield Rule, by contrast, was first articulat-
ed in England before the American tradition of voir dire 
had developed, by judges who accordingly could not 
have contemplated that the rule would extend to shield-
ing evidence of juror dishonesty during voir dire.  The 
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rule originally arose from the now discredited belief 
that witnesses should not be permitted to testify to 
their own turpitude.  And although American courts 
adopted the Mansfield Rule in narrowed form to serve 
other goals, it has never been viewed as an absolute 
prohibition on juror testimony.  To the contrary, this 
Court and others have consistently recognized that the 
rule’s objectives—shielding the jury’s deliberations 
from scrutiny and promoting finality of verdicts—must 
yield in appropriate cases to fundamental principles of 
fairness.  Indeed, in the years leading up to the adoption 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a substantial body of 
caselaw held that the Mansfield Rule does not bar the 
admission of jurors’ statements during deliberations to 
show dishonesty during voir dire. 
In light of the distinct histories and policies under-
lying voir dire and the Mansfield Rule, this Court 
should construe Rule 606(b) not to preclude admission 
of juror testimony to prove that a juror lied during voir 
dire and thus should never have been empaneled in the 
first place.  Absent a clear contrary indication, the rules 
of evidence should be presumed to have adopted the 
common-law understanding of the Mansfield Rule.  And 
nothing in Rule 606(b)’s drafting history suggests that 
Congress intended to repudiate the long-standing 
recognition that testimony regarding dishonesty in voir 
dire falls outside the scope of the Mansfield Rule.  
Moreover, given the central role that voir dire plays in 
exposing juror bias—including insidious racial bias—a 
contrary interpretation would needlessly raise grave 
constitutional concerns.  The core constitutional right to 
a fair and impartial jury militates against such a read-
ing of Rule 606(b).  Finally, the privilege accorded jury 
deliberations exists only because of safeguards such as 
voir dire that ensure an impartial jury; Rule 606(b) 
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should not be construed to undermine the basic guaran-
tee of a fair and unbiased jury on which it rests. 
ARGUMENT 
I. VOIR DIRE IS A UNIQUELY AMERICAN INSTITUTION 
THAT HAS DEVELOPED INTO AN ESSENTIAL GUARAN-
TOR OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
Under the English common law, there was no 
equivalent to the current American practice of voir 
dire; the right to interrogate potential jurors was quite 
circumscribed.  By contrast, American law has long 
recognized that litigants must have the right to ques-
tion jurors, and obtain truthful answers, to ensure that 
prospective jurors are free of bias and otherwise able to 
fulfill their duties.  Indeed, voir dire is a pillar of the 
American jury system and a fundamental safeguard of 
the right to a fair and impartial jury. 
A. English Common Law Had No Equivalent To 
The American Voir Dire Process 
Voir dire in its modern American form—the exam-
ination of jurors under oath to discover potential bases 
for challenge—was largely unknown in the English 
common law.  That is not to say that juror challenges 
did not exist.  Although such challenges were rarely 
exercised, the common law did permit litigants to chal-
lenge jurors for cause.  Where English common law dif-
fered from the modern American system, however, is in 
the method by which litigants ascertained potential ba-
ses for challenge.  Voir dire, the centerpiece of that 
process in the United States and a crucial guarantor of 
an impartial jury, did not exist in England in its modern 
American form, and questioning of prospective jurors 
played only a minimal role in English practice. 
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1. Common law challenges to jurors 
At common law, the jurors in the panel (or “little 
pane,” an “oblong piece of parchment” containing ju-
rors’ names)—were generally selected by the sheriff.  3 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 
353, 358-359 (Wendell ed. 1852); see also Hans & Vid-
mar, The Evolution of the American Jury 35 (1986).   
The sheriff returned the panel to the court “many 
weeks” prior to trial so that the litigants could familiar-
ize themselves with the jurors and determine whether 
to challenge any jurors for cause.  3 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries 355. 
The common law contained a complex taxonomy of 
challenges for cause.2  Challenges “to the array” alleged 
partiality on the part of the sheriff or other person that 
arrayed the panel.  3 Blackstone, Commentaries 359.  
Such a challenge was to all the persons on the panel and 
could result in quashing the entire array.  Id.; Coke, 
Commentary Upon Littleton 156a (19th ed. 1853) (Coke 
on Littleton).3  Challenges “to the polls,” by contrast, 
were “exceptions to particular jurors.”  3 Blackstone, 
Commentaries 359, 361. 
One ground for challenge to the polls was “suspi-
cion of bias or partiality.”  3 Blackstone, Commentaries 
363; see also Coke on Littleton 156b-158b.  Such chal-
                                                 
2 Peremptory challenges were also available, at least in crimi-
nal cases.  See Coke on Littleton 156b. 
3 Such challenges were limited in cases against the Crown.  
Coke explained that “where the king is partie, one shall not chal-
lenge the array for favour, &c. because in respect of his allegiance 
[the sheriff] ought to favour the king more.” Coke on Littleton 
156a; see also Hans & Vidmar, supra, at 35.   
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lenges fell into two categories.  “Principal” challenges 
could be raised when there were “prima facie evident 
marks of suspicion” that a juror might be biased, such 
as the juror’s kinship with a party.  3 Blackstone, 
Commentaries 363.  Challenges “to the favor,” by con-
trast, could be raised “where the party hath no princi-
pal challenge; but objects only some probable circum-
stances of suspicion, as [a juror’s] acquaintance [with a 
party] and the like.”  Id. 
2. Ascertaining bases for challenge 
“[T]he common-law rule provided for no prelimi-
nary examination [of jurors] in advance of challenge[.]”  
Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical 
Perspective 291 (2005).  Instead, litigants had to rely on 
personal knowledge or independent investigation to as-
certain potential grounds for challenging a juror, and 
were able to question jurors only after a challenge had 
been raised.4 
“[B]y the policy of the ancient law, the jury was to 
come de vicineto, from the neighborhood of the vill or 
place where the cause of action was laid in the declara-
tion[.]”  3 Blackstone, Commentaries 359.  The ra-
tionale was that jurors from the neighborhood “were 
supposed to know beforehand the character of the par-
ties and witnesses, and therefore … better knew what 
credit to give to the facts alleged in evidence.”  Id.  By 
the same token, litigants knew, or could easily investi-
gate, potential jurors’ reputations.  Making the panel 
available to the parties well in advance of trial was 
                                                 
4 Cf. id. (noting rare cases to the contrary but explaining that 
“these instances involved departure from established rule,” a “de-
viation … definitely discountenanced in the later practice”). 
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therefore an essential element of the jury-selection 
process, ensuring that “the parties … have notice of the 
jurors, and of their sufficiency or insufficiency, charac-
ters, connections, and relations, that so they may be 
challenged upon just cause.”  Id. at 355. 
Although the geographic restrictions of the “ancient 
law” loosened over time, 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 
359-360, the method for challenging jurors did not: 
The theory today is the same as stated by 
Peake at the opening of the nineteenth century, 
in his work on Evidence: “The pannell,” he 
says, “is made out and known to the parties 
long before the trial; they have an opportunity 
of inquiring as to the characters and course of 
life of the persons named in it; and if they find 
anything which destroys the competency of a 
juror, they may be prepared to prove it.” 
Millar, supra, at 292 (quoting Peake, Law of Evidence 
141 (Am. ed. 1812)). 
3. Examination of jurors 
Under the English common law, examination of ju-
rors under oath did not serve its modern American pur-
pose of uncovering potential bases for challenge.  In-
stead, it played a far more limited role in jury selection. 
At common law, challenges alleging bias or partiali-
ty for reasons that were not grounds for a principal 
challenge were decided by “triors” appointed by the 
court.  These triors heard evidence and decided “wheth-
er the juror be favorable or unfavorable.”  3 Blackstone, 
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Commentaries 363.5  As part of this process, the juror 
could in some circumstances “be examined on oath of 
voir dire, veritatem dicere.”  Id. at 364.  Such examina-
tions were rare, however, for three reasons. 
First, as discussed above, examination of jurors 
was permitted only after a challenge, and such chal-
lenges were rarely made.  Millar, supra, at 292.  That 
continues to be the case today.  “In the modern English 
practice challenges continue to be possible, but very 
seldom are interposed, and only in the rare event of a 
challenge can there be any … examination of the juror.”  
Id.; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-220 
(1965) (noting that “in England … both peremptory 
challenge and challenge for cause have fallen into dis-
use”), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
Second, even in the event of a challenge, examina-
tion of jurors did not always occur.  Litigants had to rely 
on extrinsic evidence to ascertain any causes for chal-
lenge in the first place, and could rely on the same evi-
dence to prove the cause.  Moreover, as one annotation 
to Blackstone observed of English practice, “[c]hallenges 
are seldom tried; the officer of the court, upon the objec-
tion being intimated to him, refrains from calling the ju-
ror.”  3 Blackstone, Commentaries 331 n.19. 
Third, examination of jurors was permitted only as 
to “such causes of challenge as are not to [the juror’s] 
dishonor or discredit; but not with regard to any crime, 
or any thing which tends to his disgrace or disad-
                                                 
5 Once a sufficient number of jurors were seated, the jurors 
themselves became the triors.  Id.; see also Moore, Voir Dire Ex-
amination of Jurors: I. The English Practice, 16 Geo. L.J. 438, 443 
(1927-1928) (describing procedure for deciding challenge). 
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vantage.”  3 Blackstone, Commentaries 364; Coke on 
Littleton 158b (“If the cause of challenge touch the dis-
honor or discredit of the juror, he shall not be examined 
upon his oath[.]”). 
The scope of this prohibition was surprisingly 
broad.  Notably, the prohibition extended to whether a 
juror had expressed a prior opinion regarding a case.  
In Cook’s case, for example, the defendant sought to 
question jurors as to whether “they had … said he was 
guilty, or would be hanged.”  Anonymous, 91 Eng. Rep. 
141 (K.B. 1691).  The court ruled that “[t]his is a good 
cause of challenge, but then the prisoner must prove it 
by witnesses, not out of the mouth of the juryman,” as 
such a statement “would charge [the juror] with mis-
demeanor or misbehaviour.”  Id.  The defendant could 
not inquire, the court explained, as to that which 
“would make a man discover that of himself which 
tends to shame, crime, infamy, or misdemeanor.”  Id. 
Similarly, the defendant in King v. Edmonds, 106 
Eng. Rep. 1009, 1016 (K.B. 1821), sought to challenge 
jurors “on the ground of opinions supposed to have 
been expressed by those gentlemen hostile to the de-
fendants and their cause.”  The defendant did not “offer 
to prove such an expression, by any extrinsic evidence, 
but … proposed to obtain the proof, by questions put to 
the jurymen themselves.”  Id.  The court held that it 
was proper to “refuse[] to allow such questions to be 
answered,” reasoning that “it is a very dishonourable 
thing for a man to express ill-will towards a person ac-
cused of a crime, in regard to the matter of his accusa-
tion.”  Id. at 1017. 
Accordingly, jurors were rarely questioned during 
the jury selection process.  Such questioning occurred 
only in the unusual circumstance in which (1) a litigant 
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raised a challenge to a juror after ascertaining grounds 
for the challenge through personal knowledge or inves-
tigation; (2) the litigant sought to prove the grounds for 
the challenge through testimony from the juror; and (3) 
the cause of challenge did not tend to the juror’s “dis-
honor or discredit.” 
B. America Developed A Robust Practice Of 
Voir Dire As An Essential Guarantor Of The 
Right To An Impartial Jury 
Voir dire in its modern American form bears little 
resemblance to the English model described above and 
could hardly have been contemplated by the likes of 
Coke, Blackstone, and Mansfield.  In America, voir dire 
has developed into a critical part of the jury-selection 
process and a key guarantor of the right to an impartial 
jury. 
1. Development of the American model 
The precise origins of the American practice of voir 
dire are unclear.  But as early as the 1807 trial of Aaron 
Burr, “Chief Justice Marshall had no difficulty in allow-
ing extensive examination of jurors as to their previous 
opinion of the guilt of the accused.”  Millar, supra, at 
292-293.  Such inquiry would have been prohibited un-
der English practice because it entailed both (1) ques-
tioning jurors before any challenge had been raised and 
(2) questioning jurors about prior statements regarding 
the defendant’s guilt. 
Nonetheless, “it came to be accepted in most of the 
American jurisdictions … that a preliminary question-
ing of the jurors on the voir dire, for the purpose of as-
certaining whether a challenge would be in order, was a 
definite right of the parties.”  Millar, supra, at 292.  
American practice also diverged in other significant 
ways from the British example.  American voir dire al-
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lows “a much wider field of inquiry than was permitted 
at common law.”  Id.  “The voir dire in American trials 
tends to be extensive and probing, … and the process of 
selecting a jury protracted.”  Swain, 380 U.S. at 218-
220.  The prohibition on examining jurors as to causes 
that tend to their “dishonor and discredit” likewise fell 
by the wayside.  See Millar, supra, at 292. 
2. Practical motivations 
The dramatic expansion of voir dire in American 
practice was rooted in part in the necessities of jury 
trials in a large and heterogeneous country.  The Eng-
lish practice developed in a society in which jurors were 
likely to come from the same neighborhood as the liti-
gants.  Litigants could therefore rely on personal 
knowledge of potential jurors or their reputations as a 
basis for making challenges. 
In modern times, however, litigants in U.S. courts 
are unlikely to have any personal knowledge of poten-
tial jurors or any practical ability to conduct meaningful 
investigation of jurors’ backgrounds independent of 
voir dire.  In Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 503 
(1948), for example, it appears that jurors were selected 
from a pool of over five hundred.  It is hardly feasible—
at least for litigants of average means—to conduct any 
meaningful investigation of such a large number of po-
tential jurors.  Moreover, courts have recognized that 
even if such inquiries were possible, they would be less 
desirable than the more transparent voir dire process.  
See Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778-780 (3d 
Cir. 1965) (“The impartiality of jurors should be tested 
under the control of the court rather than by the unsu-
pervised activity of investigators with all the undesira-
ble possibilities of intimidation and jury tampering 
which such surveillance inevitably presents.”). 
12 
 
3. Voir dire protects the right to an impar-
tial jury and a fair trial 
Even more significant than these practical consid-
erations, however, has been the recognition that mean-
ingful voir dire is essential to protecting the constitu-
tional right to a fair trial. 
“One touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of 
fact—‘a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely 
on the evidence before it.’”  Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 
209, 217 (1982).  Indeed, the Sixth Amendment expressly 
protects criminal defendants’ right to a trial “by an im-
partial jury.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  And although the 
Seventh Amendment, which guarantees the right to trial 
by jury for civil litigants in federal court, does not in-
clude similar language, this Court has recognized that 
“[t]he American tradition of trial by jury, considered in 
connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, 
necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a 
cross-section of the community.”  Thiel v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (emphasis added); see also 
Kiernan, 347 F.2d at 778 (“Amendment VII preserves 
‘the right of trial by jury’ in civil cases, and although the 
impartiality of the jury is not expressly mentioned it is 
inherent in the right of trial by jury[.]”); cf. McDonough 
Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 549 
(1984) (relying on “right to an impartial jury”). 
“The right to an impartial jury is” also “guaranteed 
… by principles of due process.”  Turner v. Murray, 
476 U.S. 28, 53 (1986); see also In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process.” (emphasis added)); 
Kiernan, 347 F.2d at 778 (impartial jury right is implic-
it in the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause). 
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“Voir dire examination serves to protect [the im-
partial jury] right by exposing possible biases, both 
known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors.”  
McDonough, 464 U.S. at 554; see also Tanner v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (describing voir dire as 
a “source[] of protection of petitioners’ right to a com-
petent jury”).6  “Without an adequate voir dire the trial 
judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors who 
will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instruc-
tions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.”  
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 
(1981); see also id. at 188 (“Voir dire plays a critical 
function in assuring the criminal defendant that his 
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be 
honored.”); Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving ‘Its Won-
derful Power,’ 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 549 (1975) 
(“[W]ithout a reasonable amount of information about 
the prospective jurors, the litigant cannot realize his 
right to ‘select’ the jury by challenges for cause and by 
peremptory strikes.”). 
Voir dire is particularly essential as a mechanism 
for revealing racial, religious, and like forms of preju-
dice.  As this Court long ago recognized, voir dire is crit-
ical in ferreting out those especially insidious forms of 
prejudice:  “[T]he juror best knows the condition of his 
                                                 
6 See also United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133-134 (1936) 
(finding juror qualification statute did not violate Sixth Amend-
ment right to impartial jury because “[a]ll persons otherwise quali-
fied for jury service are subject to examination as to actual bias” 
and “[a]ll the resources of appropriate judicial inquiry remain avail-
able … to ascertain whether a prospective juror, although not ex-
empted from service, has any bias in fact which would prevent his 
serving as an impartial juror”); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 
162, 171-172 (1950) (“Preservation of the opportunity to prove actu-
al bias is a guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury.”). 
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own mind” as to such biases, and thus “no satisfactory 
conclusion” about the juror’s impartiality “can be ar-
rived at, without resort to [the juror] himself.”  Al-
dridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 313 n.3 (1931) 
(quoting People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 349 (1855)).7  Racial 
prejudice, for example, is “a fact … of the most vital im-
port to the defendant.”  Id. at 313 n.1.  But that preju-
dice, “if existent, [is] locked up entirely within the 
breasts of the jurors,” and can be determined “only … 
by interrogating the juror himself.”  Id. (quoting Pinder 
v. State, 8 So. 837, 838 (Fla. 1891)).  Where voir dire 
shows that a juror “entertain[s] a prejudice which would 
preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice 
would be perpetrated in allowing him to sit.”  Id. at 314. 
This Court has accordingly held that the Constitu-
tion itself imposes “requirements with respect to ques-
tioning prospective jurors about racial or ethnic bias.”  
Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189-190.  Specifically, a de-
fendant has a constitutional right to “inquire into possi-
ble racial prejudice” when there are “substantial indica-
tions of the likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice af-
fecting the jurors in a particular case.”  Id. at 190.8  
                                                 
7 See also Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 309-311 (1880) 
(“It is evident from the examination of the jurors on their voire 
dire, that they believed that polygamy was ordained of God, and 
that the practice of polygamy was obedience to the will of God.…  
It needs no argument to show that a jury composed of men enter-
taining such a belief could not have been free from bias or preju-
dice on the trial for bigamy, of a person who entertained the same 
belief, and whose offence consisted in the act of living in polyga-
my.”). 
8 This Court has required additional protections in various 
circumstances.  “[A] capital defendant accused of an interracial 
crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of 
the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.”  Turner v. 
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Moreover, this Court has recognized that the im-
portance of such inquiries outweighs any concern—
which in part animated the English common-law re-
strictions on voir dire—about examining jurors in ways 
that could bring them into disrepute.  As the Court ex-
plained in Aldridge: 
The argument is advanced on behalf of the gov-
ernment that it would be detrimental to the 
administration of the law in the courts of the 
United States to allow questions to jurors as to 
racial or religious prejudices.  We think that it 
would be far more injurious to permit it to be 
thought that persons entertaining a disqualify-
ing prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors 
and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of 
disqualification were barred. No surer way 
could be devised to bring the processes of jus-
tice into disrepute. 
283 U.S. at 314-315. 
Voir dire’s role as the guarantor of an impartial ju-
ry is not confined to instances of racial bias or preju-
dice.  In capital cases, for example, defendants are enti-
tled to voir dire to identify “those biased persons on the 
venire who as jurors would unwaveringly impose death 
after a finding of guilt.”  Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 
                                                                                                    
Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986).  This Court also requires, as 
part of its “supervisory authority over the federal courts,” that 
“questions directed to the discovery of racial prejudice be asked in 
certain circumstances in which such an inquiry is not constitution-
ally mandated.”  Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190.  For example, 
“federal trial courts must make such an inquiry when requested by 
a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant 
and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups.”  
Id. at 192. 
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719, 733 (1992).  “Were voir dire not available to lay 
bare the foundation of petitioner’s challenge for cause” 
in such circumstances, the defendant’s right to an im-
partial jury “would be rendered … nugatory and mean-
ingless.”  Id. at 733-734. 
In sum, voir dire of a sort that would have been 
barred under the English common-law rule is now es-
sential to the American jury selection process.  Under 
the common-law rule, a litigant would have had to de-
termine whether to challenge jurors for prejudice 
based entirely on extrinsic evidence, without the bene-
fit of voir dire.  And even after such a threshold chal-
lenge was made, voir dire could have been barred under 
the rule prohibiting inquiries that tend to the juror’s 
“dishonor or discredit.”  In the modern American sys-
tem, by contrast, voir dire regarding juror bias or prej-
udice is a matter of constitutional right in appropriate 
cases, see Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189-190—a dra-
matic departure from the English common law. 
II. THE MANSFIELD RULE WAS NOT DESIGNED TO SHIELD 
DISHONESTY DURING VOIR DIRE THAT WOULD UN-
DERMINE A LITIGANT’S RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
While voir dire in its present form is an American 
innovation, the common-law predecessor to Rule 
606(b)—the Mansfield Rule—was imported from Eng-
land and originated before the American practice of voir 
dire had taken its current form.  As originally formulat-
ed, the Mansfield Rule thus did not contemplate the 
unique problems posed by juror dishonesty during voir 
dire, or the constitutional implications of precluding in-
quiry into such dishonesty.  In any event, the Mansfield 
Rule has never been understood, either as it was first 
articulated in England or as it was later applied in the 
United States, as an absolute bar to the admission of 
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evidence regarding the content of jury deliberations.  
To the contrary, in the period leading up to the adoption 
of Rule 606(b), numerous American courts recognized 
that juror testimony establishing dishonesty in voir dire 
falls outside the ambit of the Mansfield Rule. 
A. The Development Of The Mansfield Rule In 
England 
The common-law restriction on testimony regarding 
the content of jury deliberations dates from 1785, when 
the Mansfield Rule was first announced.  Before then, 
“the unquestioned practice had been to receive jurors’ 
testimony … without scruple … [and] proof of [miscon-
duct] was received equally from jurors and others with-
out discrimination.”  8A Wigmore, Treatise on the  
Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law § 2352 n.2 (3d ed. 1961) (collecting a doz-
en pre-1785 cases in which juror affidavits were accept-
ed); see also McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915) 
(“Prior to 1785 a juror’s testimony was sometimes re-
ceived, though always with great caution.”). 
The Mansfield Rule is generally traced to Lord 
Mansfield’s seminal decision in Vaise v. Delaval, 99 
Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).  In that case, two jurors 
submitted affidavits stating that the jury had decided 
the case by “tossing up,” i.e., by tossing a coin.  Lord 
Mansfield rejected the testimony, concluding that ju-
rors could not testify to their own misconduct.  The 
Mansfield Rule was soon widely adopted in England, 
and it is still followed throughout the British Common-
wealth.  See Hunter, Jury Deliberations and the Secre-
cy Rule:  The Tail That Wags The Dog?, 35 Sydney L. 
Rev. 809, 814-816 (2013). 
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As Lord Mansfield originally formulated it, the rule 
against considering juror testimony that the jury had 
decided the case through improper means was not re-
lated to protecting the integrity of jury verdicts or the 
secrecy of the jury.  Instead, it was rooted in the prin-
ciple that such testimony by a juror was unreliable be-
cause any witness who testifies to his own turpitude is 
inherently untrustworthy.9  Indeed, Lord Mansfield 
suggested that a jury verdict could be challenged based 
on the content of the jurors’ deliberations if the witness 
testifying that the case was decided by a coin toss was a 
passerby who saw the coin toss through a window, ra-
ther than a juror.  Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944 (“The 
Court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the 
jurymen themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a 
high misdemeanor[,] but in every such case the Court 
must derive their knowledge from some other source[,] 
such as from some person having seen the transaction 
through a window or by some such other means.” (foot-
note omitted)); see also 27 Wright & Gold, Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 6074 (2d ed. 2007) (“Lord Mans-
field’s rule applied only to statements offered by the 
juror directly to the court; testimony from court offic-
ers or eavesdroppers as to what jurors said during de-
liberations was not excluded.”).  Thus, the Mansfield 
Rule as originally articulated was in no way designed to 
privilege the secrecy of jury deliberations over the 
basic guarantee of an impartial jury, but only to exclude 
a type of evidence that was then thought to be particu-
larly unreliable. 
                                                 
9 Lord Mansfield advocated the position that witnesses cannot 
testify to their own turpitude in many other unrelated contexts, 
but in all other contexts it was ultimately “utterly repudiated, in 
both England and America.”  Wigmore, supra, § 2352. 
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Moreover, the Mansfield Rule was, of course, an-
nounced well before the American institution of voir 
dire had developed.  Neither Lord Mansfield nor the 
many Commonwealth courts that followed his rule 
could have envisioned either voir dire in its modern 
American form or the importance of voir dire to fair 
trials in the modern American justice system.  It is thus 
unsurprising that amici are aware of no English cases 
from this period applying (or declining to apply) the 
Mansfield Rule in evaluating the admissibility of testi-
mony regarding a juror’s false statements during voir 
dire.  Nor does it appear that the major treatises of the 
time ever considered whether the Mansfield Rule 
would appropriately apply in such a scenario. 
B. The Mansfield Rule In America 
1. Initial adoption and limitations 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, appar-
ently on the strength of the prestige of Lord Mansfield, 
the rule barring jurors from testifying to their delibera-
tions was widely adopted in America.  See Wigmore, 
supra, § 2352 (attributing adoption of the Mansfield 
Rule to the “prestige of the Great Chief Justice” and 
stating that “its authority came to receive in the United 
States an adherence almost unquestioned”). 
Over the course of the second half of the nineteenth 
century and into the twentieth century, however, while 
there was significant variation among jurisdictions, 
American courts increasingly recognized that the 
Mansfield Rule was not absolute and would yield to 
fundamental principles of fairness.  In United States v. 
Reid, 53 U.S. 361 (1851), for example, this Court con-
fronted the Mansfield Rule for the first time.  In that 
case, the defendant sought to introduce jurors’ affida-
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vits stating that they had seen newspaper articles dis-
cussing the case.  The Reid Court ultimately side-
stepped the question of the Mansfield Rule’s application 
on the ground that the articles appeared not to have 
influenced the jury’s verdict.  But, while noting that ju-
rors’ testimony about their deliberations “ought always 
to be received with great caution,” the Court noted that 
“cases might arise in which it would be impossible to 
refuse [to admit such testimony] without violating the 
plainest principles of justice.”  Id. at 366. 
The Iowa Supreme Court recognized such a limita-
tion on the Mansfield Rule in the 1866 case of Wright v. 
I&M Telegraph, 20 Iowa 195.  The court held that juror 
testimony regarding aspects of jury deliberations that 
“essentially inhere” in the verdict—such as jurors’ mis-
understanding of evidence or use of questionable rea-
soning in reaching a verdict—could not be admitted as 
a basis for obtaining a new trial.  Id. at 209-210.  By 
contrast, testimony regarding aspects of deliberations 
that did not inhere in the verdict—such as the jury’s 
use of an improper process, e.g., a coin toss, to arrive at 
a verdict—could be admitted.   Id. at 210.  Wright ac-
cordingly permitted the admission of juror testimony 
that the case had been decided by a “quotient” verdict 
(i.e., by averaging the award of damages preferred by 
each juror). 
The Iowa court rejected the logic of Vaise, observ-
ing that “if, as is universally conceded, it is the fact of 
improper practice, which avoids the verdict, there is no 
reason why a court should close its ears to the evidence 
of it from one class of persons [i.e., the jurors], while it 
will hear it from another class [i.e., eavesdroppers], 
which stands in no more enviable light and is certainly 
no more entitled to credit.”  Wright, 20 Iowa at 212.  
And the court emphasized the importance of fairness to 
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the litigants, concluding that “there can be no sound 
public policy which should prevent a court from hearing 
the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible, in 
order to administer justice to the party whose rights 
have been prejudiced” by the jury misconduct.  Id. 
Other courts followed the Iowa rule or identified 
other exceptions to or limitations on the Mansfield 
Rule.  By 1881, there were “several cases” that “held 
that the affidavits of jurors may be received” in some 
circumstances in support of a motion for a new trial.  
Rogers, Impeachment of Verdicts for Misconduct 
(1881).10 
This Court later addressed the Mansfield Rule in a 
trio of cases, each of which reiterated the basic princi-
ple that the Mansfield Rule was not absolute, but could 
be trumped by considerations of fairness.  In Mattox v. 
United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892), the Court consid-
ered juror testimony that during deliberations in a 
murder trial, the jury had read a highly prejudicial 
newspaper article and had been told by the bailiff that 
the victim was the third person the defendant had 
killed.  The Court concluded that a new trial was re-
quired, emphasizing that “public policy, which forbids 
the reception of the … statements of jurors to impeach 
their verdicts, may, in the interest of justice, create an 
exception to its own rule.”  Id. at 148.   
In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912), the 
Court considered allegations that the jurors had 
reached a compromise verdict, trading acquittal of two 
defendants for conviction of two others.  The Court cit-
                                                 
10 Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 4049, http://digital
commons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4049 (collecting cases). 
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ed Wright with approval, adopting the “inhere in the 
verdict” terminology announced in in that case.  How-
ever, it applied that framework somewhat differently 
than the Iowa Supreme Court, concluding that the alle-
gations of compromise, even if true, would merely es-
tablish facts that essentially inhere in the verdict, and 
thus could not form a basis for challenge.  Id. at 383-384. 
Finally, in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915), 
the Court considered the same question presented in 
Wright—whether juror evidence of a quotient verdict 
should be admitted—and held that it should not.  Id. at 
267-268.  The Court did not, however, disturb its hold-
ing in Hyde that the Mansfield Rule applies only to ju-
ror testimony regarding matters that inhere in the ver-
dict.  And the Court reiterated Reid’s admonition that 
the Mansfield Rule should not be applied inflexibly in a 
manner that infringed on basic principles of justice.  Id. 
at 268-269. 
2. The intersection between the Mansfield 
Rule and voir dire 
In the first half of the twentieth century, courts 
began to grapple with the intersection between voir 
dire and the Mansfield Rule.  When confronted with a 
conflict between the two, courts in many jurisdictions 
concluded that ensuring honesty in voir dire should 
trump the Mansfield Rule.  As one commentator ex-
plained: 
Cases from several jurisdictions have taken the 
position that affidavits or testimony of jurors, 
even though disclosing matters occurring in the 
jury room, may be received in support of a mo-
tion or petition for a new trial, where offered, 
and operating, to show the existence of bias or 
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prejudice of a juror, or a fact grounding a chal-
lenge of the juror for cause, concealed on his 
voir dire examination notwithstanding well-
directed questions were put to him touching 
such matters. 
Allen, Admissibility, In Civil Case, Of Juror’s Affida-
vit Or Testimony To Show Bias, Prejudice Or Disquali-
fication Of A Juror Not Disclosed On Voir Dire Exam-
ination, 48 A.L.R.2d 971 § 2 (1956). 
Although the law on this question was by no means 
uniform, a substantial body of caselaw emerged from a 
wide variety of jurisdictions recognizing that the Mans-
field Rule did not apply to cases in which evidence re-
garding a jury’s deliberations was offered to establish 
that a juror had failed to disclose bias during voir dire.  
As one court articulated the rule, “Affidavits of jurors 
may be received as to … the deliberations of the jury 
which tend to prove the existence of prejudice in the 
mind of a juror, which would prevent his acting as an 
impartial juror, where the state of mind is charged to 
have been entertained and to have been intentionally 
concealed during his voir dire examination.”  In re 
Mesner’s Estate, 176 P.2d 70, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); see 
also Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Chris-
tensen, 184 N.E. 2d. 884, 887 (Ill. 1962) (“Although [the 
Mansfield] doctrine is generally recognized, it is subject 
to an exception when it is charged that a juror has an-
swered falsely on voir dire about a matter of potential 
bias or prejudice.”); State by Lord v. Hayden Miller Co., 
116 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Minn. 1962) (“The privilege which 
protects the deliberations of the jury from exposure 
does not extend to statements of jurors who may have 
on voir dire concealed prejudice or bias which would 
have disqualified them[.]”); McNally v. Walkowski, 462 
P.2d 1016, 1019 (Nev. 1969) (“[T]he jurors’ affidavits 
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were admissible for the limited purpose of showing con-
cealment of actual bias by several of the jurors on their 
voir dire examination.”); Allison v. Department of La-
bor & Indus., 401 P.2d 982, 984 (Wash. 1965); Russ, Re-
cent Case, Evidence—Affidavit Concerning Jurors’ 
Unauthorized View Inadmissible As Ground For New 
Trial, 15 Buff. L. Rev. 217, 220 & n.29 (1965) (collecting 
New York cases showing that “[j]urors’ affidavits have 
also been accepted, in support of a motion for new trial, 
to disclose a juror’s concealed prejudice on voir dire, on 
the ground that due to his partiality he was never eligi-
ble to become a member of the jury”).11 
To be sure, some cases held that juror affidavits dis-
closing the jury’s deliberations could not be admitted 
even to show dishonesty during voir dire.  See, e.g., Wil-
son v. Wiggins, 94 P.2d 870, 871-872 (Ariz. 1939); Hinkel 
v. Oregon Chair Co., 156 P. 438, 439 (Or. 1916); see also 
Allen, supra, § 2 (collecting cases).  However, even many 
of the courts that were generally unwilling to accept 
such evidence recognized that concealed bias during voir 
dire threatens the fundamental right to a fair trial and 
requires special treatment.  Thus, while Missouri, Arizo-
na, and Kentucky courts refused to accept juror affida-
vits disclosing the contents of deliberations to show that 
                                                 
11 See also United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 
813, 819-821 (2d Cir. 1970) (considering juror testimony that dis-
closed content of deliberations where testimony established juror 
bias); Orenberg v. Thecker, 143 F.2d 375, 376-377 (D.C. Cir. 1944) 
(apparently assuming that evidence from jurors showing fraudu-
lent juror statements during voir dire could be considered on mo-
tion for new trial, but finding no such evidence); Alabama Fuel & 
Iron Co. v. Powaski, 166 So. 782, 786-788 (Ala. 1936) (allowing ad-
mission of juror affidavits to establish misconduct on voir dire, but 
only if a prima facie case of misconduct was first established using 
evidence external to the jury). 
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other jurors had been dishonest in voir dire, all of them 
held that a juror’s testimony regarding that juror’s own 
concealed bias was admissible in support of a motion for 
a new trial.  See Woodworth v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. 
Co., 274 S.W.2d 264, 270-271 (Mo. 1955); Board of Trus-
tees of Eloy Elem. Sch. Dist. v. McEwen, 430 P.2d 727, 
731-734 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967); Drury v. Franke, 57 
S.W.2d 969, 984 (Ky. Ct. App. 1933).12 
The position that the Mansfield Rule does not pre-
clude evidence of a juror’s dishonesty during voir dire 
was substantially buttressed by this Court’s decision in 
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).  There, the 
Court held that testimony regarding the content of de-
liberations is admissible in a subsequent proceeding 
against a juror for contempt resulting from dishonesty 
during voir dire, and that the general rule privileging 
the secrecy of jury deliberations had no application in 
such a case.  The Court explained that “[i]f [a juror’s] 
answers to the [voir dire] questions are willfully eva-
sive or knowingly untrue, the talesman, when accepted, 
is a juror in name only.  His relation to the court and to 
the parties is tainted in its origin; it is a mere pretense 
and sham.”  Id. at 11.  That is, a juror who lied during 
                                                 
12 These cases specifically recognized the importance of voir 
dire to ensuring an impartial trial.  See Kansas City Pub. Serv. 
Co., 274 S.W.2d at 270-271 (“It is the duty of a venireman on voir 
dire examination to fully, fairly and truthfully answer all ques-
tions, so that challenges may be intelligently exercised, and the 
venireman’s intentional concealment of a material fact may require 
the granting of a new trial.”); Drury, 57 S.W.2d at 984 (noting that 
a litigant may be “entitled to a new trial because a juror gave a 
false answer, or no answer, to a pertinent question addressed to 
him on the voir dire examination” and that “the right [to] challenge 
[a juror] includes the incidental right that the information elicited 
on the voir dire examination shall be true”). 
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voir dire should never have been seated on the jury in 
the first place.  Admitting evidence regarding the ju-
ror’s misstatements thus did not improperly intrude 
into the jury’s deliberations, but preserved the core 
guarantee of an impartial jury. 
Although Clark arose in the context of contempt 
proceedings, its logic was clearly applicable to cases in 
which a litigant sought a new trial based on a juror’s 
dishonesty during voir dire.  Indeed, Clark itself noted 
that the rule that “the testimony of a juror is not ad-
missible for the impeachment of his verdict” is “not 
without exception,” and cited Hyman v. Eames, 41 F. 
676 (D. Colo. 1890)—a case in which juror testimony 
regarding the content of deliberations was admitted to 
show that a juror had concealed bias during voir dire—
as an example.  Clark, 289 U.S. at 18.  In Hyman, the 
court held that when “considering the competency of [a 
challenged juror] to sit as a juror … the testimony of 
his associates may be received.”  41 F. at 677-678. 
After Clark, several courts drew the obvious paral-
lel and concluded that if juror testimony was admissible 
for purposes of punishing a dishonest juror, it should 
logically be admissible to remedy the consequences of 
the juror’s dishonesty in a proceeding to determine 
whether a litigant should receive a new trial.  See Pet. 
Br. 29 (collecting cases).  The 1961 edition of Wigmore’s 
treatise likewise endorsed the proposition that juror 
testimony should be admissible to establish dishonesty 
during voir dire.  As Wigmore explained, “the privilege 
[against introduction of juror testimony] ceases where 
the inquiry concerns a crime committed by the juror 
prior to the jury’s retirement, e.g., perjury in answering 
questions on the voir dire.”  Wigmore, supra, § 2354 
(emphasis in original).  Overall, the weight of authority 
was such that a commentator in 1958 concluded:  “If a 
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juror’s remarks during deliberations indicate that he 
has given false answers or has concealed relevant in-
formation on the voir dire, it is settled that the verdict 
may be impeached”—that is, that testimony regarding 
the jury’s deliberations could be admitted in support of 
a motion for a new trial.  Comment, Impeachment of 
Jury Verdicts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 360, 367-368 n.53 
(1958) (emphasis added). 
III. RULE 606(b) SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO EX-
CLUDE JUROR TESTIMONY REGARDING DISHONESTY 
DURING VOIR DIRE 
The history of, and policies underlying, the Mans-
field Rule and the American practice of voir dire 
strongly support the conclusion that Rule 606(b) does 
not bar admission of juror testimony regarding the con-
tent of deliberations to show dishonesty during voir 
dire.  As discussed above, the English common-law re-
gime that created the Mansfield Rule did not accord 
voir dire the same central place as a guarantor of core 
constitutional rights that it occupies in this country; 
American courts have always recognized that funda-
mental principles of fairness trump the Mansfield Rule; 
and the rule was widely understood not to bar juror 
testimony showing dishonesty during voir dire.  There 
is no indication whatever that the drafters of Rule 
606(b) intended to depart from these principles, and 
Rule 606(b) should be construed to harmonize with, ra-
ther than to repudiate, long-settled common law. 
Moreover, construing Rule 606(b) to bar admission 
of testimony relating to juror dishonesty during voir 
dire would trench upon the basic right to an impartial 
jury.  Such a construction would thus raise grave con-
stitutional concerns.  It would also be at war with the 
premises on which Rule 606(b) is predicated.  For these 
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reasons, too, the court of appeals’ reading of Rule 
606(b) should be rejected. 
A. The History Of The Mansfield Rule Is Incon-
sistent With The Construction Of Rule 606(b) 
Adopted By The Court Of Appeals 
As this Court recognized in Tanner v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), “Federal Rule of Evidence 
606(b) is grounded in the common-law rule against ad-
mission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict and the 
exception for juror testimony relating to extraneous in-
fluences.”  Id. at 121.  “The normal rule of statutory con-
struction is that if Congress intends for legislation to 
change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, 
it makes that intent specific.”  Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. 
New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 
(1986).  Therefore, unless the drafters clearly indicated 
a contrary intent, Rule 606(b) should be read to codify 
the Mansfield Rule as it was applied and understood at 
the time the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted—
that is, as not barring introduction of a juror’s testimony 
regarding statements made during deliberations that 
show juror dishonesty during voir dire. 
As petitioner ably demonstrates, neither the text 
nor the legislative history of Rule 606(b) reveals any 
such contrary intent.  By its terms, the rule addresses 
only an “inquiry into the validity of a verdict,” not an 
inquiry into the composition of the jury.  Fed. R. Evid. 
606(b) (emphasis added).  As this Court recognized in 
Clark, a juror who lies during voir dire “is a juror in 
name only.”  289 U.S. at 11.  Accordingly, a challenge to 
the seating of that juror is not an inquiry into the validi-
ty of the jury’s verdict.  Indeed, Rule 606(b)’s legislative 
and drafting history reflect no consideration of juror 
dishonesty during voir dire.  Nor is there any indication 
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that Congress intended to reject the substantial body of 
caselaw holding that juror testimony establishing that a 
juror was dishonest during voir dire does not fall within 
the scope of the Mansfield Rule.  See Pet. Br. 30-35.  
Rule 606(b) should accordingly be interpreted to permit 
admission of evidence of juror dishonesty during voir 
dire. 
B. Rule 606(b) Should Not Be Construed In A 
Way That Would Threaten The Constitutional 
Right To An Impartial Jury 
Moreover, interpreting Rule 606(b) to preclude ju-
ror testimony regarding dishonesty during voir dire 
would conflict with the fundamental constitutional right 
to an impartial jury.  Rule 606(b) need not, and should 
not, be so interpreted.  Under the constitutional avoid-
ance canon, “[a] statute must be construed, if fairly pos-
sible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is un-
constitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.”  
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 
(1998).  The canon “rest[s] on the reasonable presump-
tion that Congress did not intend” an interpretation 
“which raises serious constitutional doubts.”  Clark v. 
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005). 
As discussed in Part I.B.3, supra, voir dire is a key 
safeguard of the right to an impartial jury—explicitly 
guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment and inherent in 
the Seventh Amendment and Due Process Clause—
because it enables the litigants and the court to screen 
out biased jurors (including racially or religiously prej-
udiced jurors).  When jurors intentionally conceal par-
tiality or prejudice, the right to a fair trial that has al-
ways been understood as providing a limit on the Mans-
field Rule is threatened.  See McDonough Power 
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) 
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(“The necessity of truthful answers by prospective ju-
rors if [voir dire] is to serve its purpose is obvious.”). 
Numerous commentators have recognized the po-
tential constitutional concerns that would arise if de-
fendants were denied a remedy for verdicts that are 
the product of biased jurors who would not have been 
empaneled had they responded honestly during voir 
dire.  See, e.g., Miller, Dismissed with Prejudice: Why 
Application of the Anti-Jury Impeachment Rule to Al-
legations of Racial, Religious, or Other Bias Violates 
the Right to Present a Defense, 61 Baylor L. Rev. 872, 
880-881 (2009); Federal Practice & Procedure § 6074 
(noting that “there is a serious problem in using Rule 
606(b) to exclude all testimony of jury bias.  Democratic 
institutions like the jury can produce oppression when 
the majority uses its values to demean the rights of mi-
norities.”); Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad Ex-
clusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. 
L. Rev. 509, 524 (1988) (“A disturbing context involving 
the issue of jury misconduct … occurs when a juror 
manifests racial bias during deliberations.”). 
In many cases, statements made during jury delib-
erations will be the only evidence of dishonesty during 
voir dire.  As a result, prohibiting testimony about the 
content of deliberations will often leave litigants with 
no remedy for a trial by a jury that did not satisfy con-
stitutional standards for impartiality.  See Perkins v. 
LeCureux, 58 F.3d 214 (6th Cir. 1995) (Jones, J., con-
curring) (“The rule of juror incompetency cannot be ap-
plied in such a manner as to deny due process.”); cf. 
Clark, 289 U.S. at 12-14 (juror privilege against testify-
ing about deliberations does not apply where the juror 
was seated on false pretenses because maintaining the 
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privilege in those circumstances “is paying too high a 
price for the assurance to a juror of serenity of mind”). 
Of course, not every question asked during voir dire 
would uncover prejudice of the kind that amounts to a 
denial of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.  
But as this Court has observed, the constitutional 
avoidance canon is a tool for “choosing between compet-
ing plausible interpretations of a statutory text,” not a 
“method of adjudicating constitutional questions by oth-
er means.”  Clark, 543 U.S. at 381.  Thus, “[i]t is not at 
all unusual to” impose “a limiting construction called for 
by one of the statute’s applications, even though other 
of the statute’s applications, standing alone, would not 
support the same limitation.”  Id. at 380.  As this Court 
has recognized, there is a significant set of cases in 
which barring a litigant from demonstrating that a juror 
lied during voir dire would amount to denial of the core 
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.  See supra Part 
I.B.3.  Rule 606(b) should not be construed to permit 
that result. 
C. Precluding Evidence Of Dishonesty In Voir 
Dire Would Undermine Rule 606(b)’s Premise 
Finally, construing Rule 606(b) to preclude juror 
testimony about dishonesty in voir dire would under-
mine a basic premise of that rule. 
It is only the existence of a robust voir dire pro-
cess—the key safeguard of an impartial jury—that jus-
tifies deferring to the jury’s verdict and generally bar-
ring inquiry into the jury’s deliberative process.  As 
this Court made clear in Tanner, “the protection of jury 
deliberations from intrusive inquiry” rests on the as-
sumption that “[t]he suitability of an individual for the 
responsibility of jury service … is examined during voir 
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dire.”  483 U.S. at 127; see also, e.g., United States v. 
Duzac, 622 F.2d 911, 913 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding the 
rule against admitting testimony that jurors’ “personal 
prejudices were not put aside during deliberations” on 
the ground that “[t]he proper time to discover such 
prejudices is when the jury is being selected and per-
emptory challenges are available to attorneys.”). 
Voir dire’s “protection of [the] right to a competent 
jury,” Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127, is a predicate on which 
Rule 606(b) is premised and the rule can only be 
properly understood in that light.  Rule 606(b) should 
not be construed in a manner that weakens the efficacy 
of the voir dire safeguard by denying litigants a remedy 
for dishonesty during voir dire, and thereby undercuts 
the rule’s foundation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eighth Circuit’s judgment should be reversed 
and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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